THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND CHINESE SOCIETY: POPULAR ATTITUDES TOWARD PARTY MEMBERSHIP AND THE PARTY'S IMAGE Stanley Rosen
The exhilarating, then tragic, events of April-June 1989 in Beijing brought the Chinese leadership's internal divisions and its collective estrangement from the society it governs into living rooms throughout the world. The demands and grievances articulated in the popularly-supported student demonstrations, however, should already have been well-known to China's leaders. Since the development of survey research in the early 1980s, followed by the establishment of public opinion institutes in the mid-1980s, Chinese authorities have initiated many studies to monitor public attitudes and behaviour across a wide area of political, social and economic life. Private polling agencies have gone even further, attempting to push their inquiries into 'forbidden areas', despite the lack of official support or even outright criticism of such endeavours.l In the wake of the military crackdown of 4 June, and the continuing pursuit of ideological and political conformity, the most important and innovative state and private public opinion centres are being dismantled, with their leaders and supporters placed under arrest. Because of its value as a propaganda tool, Party-sponsored opinion polling may well continue; however, given the current political environment, one can expect the familiar flaws of survey research in Communist systems, such as deliberately loaded questions and cliched Party-line responses, to be greatly exacerbated, rendering the results virtually useless as a guide to understanding Chinese society.2
Survey data gathered prior to the crackdown, however, is an important source of information on the public image of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In this paper, the survey data will be integrated with other sources -the national and local press, provincial Party journals, and statistics on Party membership -to examine the Party's changing relationship with society in the post-Mao period and to suggest some reasons for the CCP's loss of support.
The picture presented is of a Party mired in a series of contradictions, which had never fully recovered from its battering in the Cultural Revolution and the subsequent repudiation of that movement. In the post-Mao period, economic development had become the Party's central task. Toward that end, the recruitment base was shifted to attract the young and educated. At the same time, all citizens were to adhere to the Four Basic Principles (adherence to socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, rule by the Chinese Communist Party, and acceptance of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought), the actual content of which remained amorphous. The result was ideological confusion, since older, generally uneducated Party members who had joined and been promoted because of political loyalty and adherence to a discredited doctrine were expected to implement a policy which they often regarded with scepticism. No longer a monolithic political force, the CCP was characterized by a series of generations with divergent interests. In the absence of a unifying ideology, and faced with the temptations of a partially reformed economic system, corruption ran unchecked. Indeed, it was difficult under the reforms even to define corruption.
Given its personalistic, hierarchical network of protective relationships, the CCP was unable to supervise itself and restore public confidence in its honesty and competence. At the same time, governed by octogenarians who had been ousted and publicly disgraced by Mao's assault on the Party in the 1960s, Party elders were unwilling to risk any public scrutiny from outside that might threaten their control. While society was changing dramatically under the impact of the economic reforms and the open policy, they refused to permit any autonomous 2 On such problems, see Vladimir Shlapentokh, The Politics of Sociology in the Soviet Union (Westview Press, Boulder, 1987) . political activity by the newly rising social forces. The CCP in effect had placed itself in a potentially humiliating position: on the one hand, it sought to recruit the best and the brightest of the students and the richest of the new entrepreneurial peasants; on the other hand, its economic policies had diminished the importance of Party membership. Social mobility could now be achieved outside the Party, raising questions of the Party's function in society, even threatening its relevance. As an indication of its loss of influence, transmission belts -the Communist Youth League (CYL), trade unions, university student unions, and so forth -had atrophied. Their work was usually considered superfluous, even by their own members. When the Party's major remaining source of legitimacy -an expanding economy leading to a steadily rising standard of living -also soured in 1988, the stage was set for the massive street demonstrations of spring 1989 .
Before examining what opinion surveys tell us about attitudes in the late 1980s toward the Party, however, it is essential to examine first the actual characteristics of the Party and the make-up of its membership.
Party Membership: An Overview
The Chinese Party-state has been in power for only 40 years and has yet to establish binding and formally institutionalized procedures for leadership roles and decision-making. Rules of the game which have been worked out with much difficulty are consistently violated when 'senior comrades' -ostensibly in retirement -perceive a threat to their system. Revolutionary seniority retains its importance. Of China's 48 million Party members, only 5 per cent joined before 1949. Of these, 598,000 joined during the war against Japan (1937-45); 20,200 trace their membership to the period of agrarian revolution in the late 1920s and early 1930s; and 470 'old comrades' said to be 'alive and in good health' (iianzai) joined still earlier.3 Following Deng Xiaoping's reliance on the support of senior comrades in the military pacification of Beijing in June 1989, the CCP has mounted a propaganda campaign to justify the practice of allowing old cadres to hang onto power. Party committees at central and regional levels have been instructed to set more store by the views of first-generation cadres, while octogenarians on the Central Advisory Commission (CAC), a body set up for retired officials, have pushed for a greater role in the day-to-day running of state affairs. Song Renqiong, a deputy director of the CAC, reportedly has demanded that members of the CAC's Standing Committee should take part in politburo meetings.4 Until the 'founding fathers' are physically removed from the political stage by death, institutionalization remains unlikely.
The concept of revolutionary generations, however, is not limited to the pre-1949 period. Party officials commonly distinguish three distinct recruitment periods: (1) from 1949-1966, when recruitment was institutionalized and directed through feeder organizations such as the CYL and People's Liberation Army (PLA). Since entrance to these organizations was likewise highly competitive, the CCP had its pick of China's best and brightest, varying recruitment targets each year depending on whether expertise or politics (the Expert vs Red dilemma) was stressed; (2) the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) , during which bureaucratic organizations like the CYL were disbanded, admission was simplified, and those from 'good' class backgrounds (workerpeasant-cadre) who were political activists were favoured. To ensure flexibility, it was no longer necessary for a new Party member to be placed on a year's probation prior to full membership; and (3) the post-Cultural Revolution period (1978-present), when the CCP has emphasized economic development, and has moved to recruit those most likely to support and further the nation's attempt at rapid modernization. Thus, the Party is likely to remain riven by generational and political cleavages even after the departure of the elders.5 Table 1 presents a more complete picture of the growth in Party membership over time. Each of the three political generations constitute approximately one third of the membership.
The CCP in the Post-Mao Period As China has modernized, the CCP has been transformed from an overwhelmingly peasant-based Party to one in which all sectors of society are represented. This transformation began with the First FiveYear Plan (1953-57) when industrial workers and intellectuals began to be recruited in large numbers. Table 2 , despite some important gaps in the available data, shows the steep decline in the percentage of Party members from the peasantry. The number of production workers, heavily recruited during the Cultural Revolution, has also declined in recent years.
Even with the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping and the new emphasis on economic development decided at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978), adjustments in Party recruitment policy were gradual. From 1977-83, only five million new members were added, far below the Cultural Revolution rate of recruitment. Local-level cadres resisted the new state priorities, which called for recruitment based on ability rather than political loyalty, often failing to meet quotas set by higher levels. Central Committee directives repeatedly called for the accelerated recruitment of intellectuals (1982, 1985) and college students (1983) into the Party.6 The CCP desperately needed an infusion of youth and talent to pursue its ambitious economic targets. At the end of 1983, fewer than 1 per cent of China's college students were Party members, the lowest figure since 1956.7 The percentage of Party members 25 years of age and below was 3.34 per cent; the 1950 figure had been 26.6 per cent. The drop in Shanghai was even steeper, going from 41 per cent to 2.25 per cent.8
The solution was to increase sharply the number of recruits, so that six million new members were added between 1984-86, with a dramatic Table 3 shows that Party members with senior high school The post-crackdown reversion to a stress on seniority and political loyalty after Deng's hard-fought rejuvenation campaign is all the more ironic, and is likely to have a major negative impact on future recruitment.
The emphasis on education, youth, and ability in Party recruitment has not pleased everyone. Some letters to newspapers have complained that students in 'key' senior high schools -which have priority funding and the best teachers, and are expected to funnel virtually all their students into the best universities -are actively recruited into the Party, considering any questions and examining all our work is whether it is beneficial to the development of the productive forces'.20 The Party has therefore made a major effort to attract new rich peasants, the so-called 'specialized households' and 'ten-thousand-yuan households'. Aside from its mixed record of success in appealing to such youth (to be discussed below), the CCP's policy continues to meet with resistance from veteran Party members in the countryside. Disgruntled basic-level cadres have complained: 'In the past, the Communist Party loved the poor, now they love the rich; so long as you can lead people to become rich, you're a good Party member. In the past, entrance to the CCP depended on a person's class background; now you look to see if a person is a specialized or ten-thousand-yuan household. In the past, you looked at class consciousness; now you look at one's ability to become rich'.21
Judging from the debates featured in provincial Party journals, Party authorities are at times defensive about their stress on the most economically successful elements. Moreover, the debates show that guidelines for recruitment are not adequately understood at the basic levels. Although there is no space to discuss the issues raised in detail, a brief listing of some of the debate forums may convey the uncertainty. In Jiangsu province, a forum over many months was entitled: 'In the primary stage of socialism, should the Party raise or lower its demands on members?'22 In Liaoning province, there have been a series of forums in 1988 and 1989, also on the standards for Party members under the new conditions. One noteworthy discussion concerned the suitability of recruiting a millionaire who ran a private enterprise hiring large number of workers. The question of whether to permit 'exploiters' to enter the Party has been a common theme in many journals. One must be cautious in interpreting any Chinese survey data, particularly where the issues are politically sensitive. While many surveys raising political issues are conducted, most present obvious methodological problems. For example, virtually all surveys are reported far too tersely and provide inadequate information regarding sampling techniques, questionnaire design, and so forth. At best, one can avoid the most obvious traps. Thus, we have disregarded the truncated reports appearing in large circulation newspapers and magazines, which are published primarily for 'educational' reasons, to reflect the 'message' the survey is meant to convey to the paper's/journal's readership. We have also tended to avoid surveys with very small samples. In general, the surveys selected are those which have appeared in restricted circulation publications conducted by and for specialists and not intended to be seen by the general public; thus, the propaganda function of such surveys should be minimal. Where possible, we have also tried to use surveys which employ a national sample, and that distinguish respondents by occupation, age, or other sociological variables. The relatively primitive state of Chinese survey research, combined with the internal dissemination of most political sociological studies, has of necessity limited the available data.
Surveys on Students and Young Intellectuals
As we have seen, the CCP's major effort to attract university students and other intellectuals has begun to pay dividends, particularly after 1984. Nevertheless, compared to earlier decades the numbers have been relatively disappointing. The emphasis here will be on the subjective factor. The drop in student interest stems in part from the effects of the post-Mao stress on economic development over political and ideological concems, and in part reflects a loss of faith in the Party itself.
In a sense, CCP policy has been too successful in providing altematives for China's youth. Before the Cultural Revolution, students adopted strategies which led them to seek either academic/professional success (the 'expert' path) or to engage in political activism (the 'Red' path). Those who opted for professional success only and avoided activism, however, commonly did so because their class origins were 'impure' (i.e., they were not of worker-poor peasant-cadre background) and thus had limited opportunities. Most students eagerly sought to enter the CYL and would gladly have joined the CCP, since membership was considered the primary indication of -and reward for -success in Chinese society. Alternative routes to success shrank during the Cultural Revolution, since academic/professional success was downgraded and intellectuals faced political discrimination.
Post-Mao China is popularly said to offer three routes for ambitious youth: black, red, and gold. The black way is to leave China to study abroad, to earn a black graduation cap and gown. The red way refers to joining the CCP and becoming a government official. The gold way involves going into business in the hope of becoming rich. When 344 graduating students at Beijing's elite Qinghua University were asked which route they preferred, 73.8 per cent chose the black route, noting that in terms of state policy and treatment, this was the surest path to success. Only 5.5 per cent chose the red route, noting that to succeed in this more risky path one needed the right family and social connections. It is widely believed that those likely to be politically successful must belong to the 'princes' faction' (taizidang), so-called because they are the children and relatives of the CCP leaders. Students refer to joining the CCP as 'a game of snakes and ladders'; such personal connections offer protection for the few willing to risk the treacherous climb. Only 9.3 per cent expressed a willingness to pursue the gold route, noting that it could not match the black path in terms of public prestige and fell below the red path in terms of material benefits. 25 A number of surveys have been conducted to probe more specifically the lack of interest in the Party shown by young intellectuals. They generally show a concern with 'professional improvement' but not with 'socialist morality', as one such survey noted. Success in their careers is considered 'substantial', while political progress is 'insubstantial'. The decisive factors in achieving recognition, even to when choosing a model worker or outstanding Party member, not to mention promotions and pay rises, are 'professional proficiency and personal connections', and 'have nothing to do with one's political aspirations'. Moreover, they feel that concern with politics early in their careers will hold them back professionally; at the same time, they realize that the more they stand out professionally, the easier their access will be to Party membership.26 Somewhat contradictorily, available surveys also show that interest in Party membership is directly proportional to one's year in school, peaking among graduating seniors. Interviewees explain that Party membership can be crucial in obtaining a good job assignment.27
This concem with professional success, Chinese authorities lament, is primarily an individual quest, and young people today lack the social conscience of their predecessors. In part, this is clearly a reaction against an overdose of political education in the past. For example, a survey at one 'famous university' revealed that only 11 per cent of the students sampled acknowledged the value of the concept 'Serve the People', which has long been considered -officially at least -to represent one of The lack of interest in the officially-sanctioned political value system has seriously affected the Party's transmission belts to youth, which are expected to channel, as well as contain, grassroots demands toward the leadership. One recent report, addressing the failure of the CYL as a mass organization, noted that 'the fatal weakness of CYL organizations is their being unable to represent the specific interests of young people, thus losing their attractiveness and appeal'.29 University student unions, like the CYL, have also been seen to represent 'official' interests, not the young people's interests. When the newly established student union at Wuhan University conducted a survey in September 1987, 80 per cent of the students said they did not trust the student union and 90 per cent felt that the work of the union was unrelated to their interests.30 In the 1989 demonstrations, a key issue dividing the students and the leadership, of course, was the latter's insistence that any dialogue be conducted through officially sanctioned youth organizations, while the students sought official recognition for their own independent organization.
In this atmosphere, CYL cadres have been thoroughly demoralized, claiming victimization from above as well as below. Noting that fewer CYL and political cadres have been promoted in an era when economic work and management is stressed, they complain that 'there is no future for a CYL cadre'. Pleading for greater Party support for these beleaguered cadres, a leading CYL official recently pointed out how untenable their position was during the 1989 demonstrations, when 'many of them were attacked by students and masses unclear about the truth of the matter, even slandered as "traitors to students", and denounced by big character posters'.31 Even when the Party has been able to attract new members from among university students, it has little to do with the effectiveness of ideological-political work. Most are seen by their peers as joining out of 'impure' motives. A more detailed study of Chinese workers, using a national sample, was conducted by the General Trade Unions in 1986. Table 6 presents some data from that study. The negative evaluation of the Party is quite striking. The majority of the respondents expressed critical views toward Party members with whom they had direct contact. Moreover, after the 36 This survey also showed that younger workers were more dissatisfied with Party workstyle and more critical of worker-cadre relations; that cadres saw more improvement in Party workstyle than technical personnel, with workers noting the least improvement; and that positive attitudes of workers toward Party workstyle is directly related to enhancement in one's personal standard of living. There is clearly a change for the better. 7.05%
There is some change for the better. 44.71%
There hasn't been any clear improvement 36.67%
Things are worse off than they were 10.28%
previously.
(2) What is your assessment of the Party members around you?
They are all able to play an exemplary and leadership role. 5.29%
Most of them can play an exemplary and leadership role. 38.93%
Only a small part among them can play an exemplary and 38.11% leadership role.
None of them can play an exemplary and leadership role. 2.86%
They are worse than the ordinary masses. 13.12% 
Surveys on Peasants
As with workers and intellectuals, the CCP has attempted to recruit those in the countryside who are considered most crucial to the success of the refonns. This policy has been particularly controversial in the rural areas because such individuals are often newly wealthy peasants who have left traditional farming to become specialized households, i.e., those which are engaged in the production of one commodity, or who operate private enterprises hiring outside labour. The Party has had only mixed success with this policy. As has been noted, many rural Party officials find it hard to reconcile the embrace of those who engage in exploitation and who earn their living without doing manual labour. At the same time, the newly rich and better educated are often not enthusiastic about joining the Party. As one Party journal described their attitude: 'They like to watch from behind. It's of no use to join the Party. If you have money, you have everything. If you're not in the Party, you can do anything you want without restraints'.37 One survey of 1,936 rural youth below the age of 30 who had graduated from junior or senior high school and returned to their respective townships in Gansu province found that only 6.1 per cent had expressed either oral or written interest in Party membership. They felt that, 'Now all that's necessary is to become rich. Whether or not you're a Party member makes no difference'.38 A number of other surveys and narrative accounts, however, suggest that an indeterminate number of the young rich peasants are attracted to the Party -albeit for the wrong reasons. They see Party membership as a form of 'political capital', since 'money without power is less than 100 per cent safe'. Their purpose in joining is to gain a 'politically protective umbrella'.39 Rich peasant families admit that they had sent a son to do a three-year tour of duty in the military for the same reasons, to add a patina of political redness to go with their economic success, and also to offer some protection in case the CCP's policy of allowing the peasants to become wealthy were to change.40 One intriguing survey of young well-to-do peasants who had entered the military discovered that 38 per cent had enlisted as a short-cut to Party membership -which they felt would shield them from the extortion of local officials -while another 40 per cent entered to earn a trade, such as truck driving, which would increase their wealth. 41 The ambivalence to rich Party recruits is discussed in the surveys and also comes through in advice given to local Party branches, which are urged not to be too impulsive in recruiting private entrepreneurs just because they have done good deeds: 'With one hand some may endow a building; with the other hand they may be digging up the cornerstone of socialism'.42 Local journals carry stories about the lessons to be learned from 'larcenous ten-thousand-yuan households' who had been designated 'outstanding Party members'.43
When rural youths in a prosperous county outside Shanghai were asked about motivations to join the Party, 50.6 per cent saw it as a 'refuelling station' on the individual's road to advancement; 31.7 per cent felt it would make it easier to seek personal gain; and 15.4 per cent felt that joining the Party was not particularly very important. More revealing were the comments of those who already had applied to join: 56.1 per cent felt that 'in recent years if you don't get in, it doesn't matter', and 'if you run into complications, forget it'.44 In the Wenzhou area in Zhejiang province, where private enterprise and the hiring of labour is particularly common, membership in the Party appears not to guarantee material success. A survey of one town in this area found that Table 7 presents some findings from that survey. There are several points worthy of attention. First, the investigators acknowledged the likelihood that respondents in the countryside would search for the most officially 'correct' response to political questions. Thus, in asking for reasons to seek Party membership, they included the option 'By joining the Party you can struggle even harder to realize the ideals of communism', but allowed respondents to have two choices. A number of surveys, particularly those conducted in the rural areas, have used this method to elicit more honest responses. 46 Second, it shows that many more viewed Party membership as helpful to their future than as a means to gain respect. In poorer provinces like Shanxi, Party membership was seen as particularly important to one's future.
The poorest province in the nine-province survey, Gansu, showed over 50 per cent of the respondents ticking off this choice; in more prosperous Guangdong, by contrast, only 38.2 per cent opted for it. Third, the rural young people in poorer provinces were generally more eager to join the Party than those in Guangdong.47 Fourth, a significant proportion of the respondents would not dare to object openly to 'improper practices' stemming from abuses of power. Fewer than half the respondents would 'bring such practices to light for investigation'. Because the surveyors do not disaggregate the data sufficiently in this section (on certain other questions, there is disaggregation by age, sex, and educational level) and offer virtually no analysis, these conclusions remain highly tentative. We are told, however, that willingness to reveal improper practices declines with age. Thus, 42.6 per cent of the 15-19 year olds would reveal such corruption, declining to 34.6 per cent among the 25-29 year olds.
The Public's Image of the Party
Former CCP general secretary Zhao Ziyang, dismissed in May 1989 during the student occupation of Tiananmen Square, was a forceful advocate of the use of public opinion to 'supervise' the Party. The growth of scientific polling is closely associated with his leading think tank, the Chinese Economic Structural Reform Research Institute (CESRRI). During his tenure, a number of private public opinion institutes were also established, with Zhao encouraging government agencies to hire these pollsters to conduct surveys which might enable the central authorities to better understand Chinese society, provide an outlet for public discontent, and to aid in policy decision.48 In this more liberalized atmosphere, particularly after Zhao's speech at the Thirteenth Party Congress in October 1987 at which the theme of public supervision was stressed, there was a visible increase in polling on sensitive political questions. Table 9 , from the same survey, details the types of corruption by
Party officials considered most objectionable by the public. It is interesting to note that the 'most detested conduct' and the 'conduct with the worst effects' both relate to the abuse of official power, either directly through graft and bribes, or aiding relatives and friends to gain political, economic, or educational benefits. This is consistent with the results cited in Table 7 , which show peasant youths strongly objecting to the same practices.
In July 1987, the private Beijing Institute for Social and Economic Research independently initiated a survey on the political psychology of Chinese citizens. Intended as the first of a series of such studies, the researchers were seeking to delineate the 'political culture' of China, and to explore the social and psychological reasons for the country's lack of democratization. Critical of methodological weaknesses in most Chinese surveys, the researchers were careful to gather sufficient data to explore the interrelations between the sociological and psychological variables. Thus, some of their findings are disaggregated by occupation, age, education, and political affiliation.51 The parts of their findings which have been published -mainly through Hong Kong -confirm and amplify the results from more official studies. For example, they found that 57 per cent of respondents were not interested in becoming Party members. Moreover, when asked about 'the use of Party members as models for the rest of society', only 18 per cent felt that this was a good idea, while more than 78 per cent felt it was a bad idea. Given such results, it is not surprising to discover, in Tables 10 and 11 , that a majority of the public, regardless of occupation, held negative images of the CCP; such impressions were highest among intellectuals and cadres.
Party members themselves were more positive, although even here over 40 per cent indicated they were 'not proud to be a Party member'.52 51 Another casualty of the 1989 crackdown, much of this institute's work will remain 'unavailable'. 52 While 5,000 questionnaires were distributed nationwide, only 3,221 were properly filled out and returned. Because the survey was conducted by a private agency, in some localities there was reluctance by respondents to participate. When added to the number of improperly filled out questionnaires, the researchers noted, the validity of the survey could be called into question. Still, of all the public opinion institutes -both public and private -operating in China at that time, Perhaps the most pessimistic assessment of Party corruption comes from university students. Indeed, it had been one of the major reasons for the large-scale student demonstrations of December 1986 and spring 1989. When an extensive survey on political attitudes of university students was conducted under the auspices of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee before and after the 1986 demonstrations, the results could not have pleased the authorities. Even after the demonstrations had been put down and criticized as an example of 'bourgeois liberalization', 62 per cent of the undergraduates and 92 per cent of the graduate students saw the root cause of the student unrest to be either corrupt Party workstyle or the lack of democracy. Even after the three and a half year Party rectification campaign, 60 per cent of the graduate students saw no improvement in Party members' workstyle, with some suggesting it had declined. Table 12 , drawn from that study, shows that fewer than 10 per cent of the undergraduates were 'very confident' that Very confident 9.7%
Believe that it will basically improve, but not confident the 44.6% Chinese authorities have argued that a major reason for the lack of action against clearly unqualified Party members is a fear of committing 'leftist' mistakes, of being accused of repeating the techniques of innerParty struggle associated with the Cultural Revolution. Indeed, insofar as this fear exists, it merely reflects the apprehensions of Party elders at the top of the system. One of the key lessons they absorbed during their Cultural Revolution tribulations was the need to protect the Party from an aroused and mobilized society. Thus, during the rectification campaign, they deliberately minimized the input of criticism by non-Party members, and avoided any excesses which might bring back Cultural Revolution memories. Such self-imposed limits strongly contributed to the perfunctory and unsuccessful nature of the campaign.57 But as local Party journals reveal, the problem is also more complicated. There is difficulty, for example, even in defining economic corruption given ideological guidelines that are both unclear and contradictory. This reflects the lack of ideological coherence at the top of the political system. Given the continuing popular dissatisfaction with Party corruption, a small part of the task of exposure has been turned over to the masses. In the second half of 1988, a series of 24-hour 'hotlines' were set up throughout the country to report official corruption. The network covers 17 provinces, 106 municipalities, and 380 counties and districts (one of the country's 2,300 counties). In total, there are 2,400 reporting centres to which citizens can make phone or written complaints. Preliminary results show that citizens have taken advantage of the greater anonymity afforded by the hotlines and the post office. In just two months in 1988, more than 44,000 complaints were received. However, although the CCDI has received 330,000 letters of complaint over the last five years and local commissions have received another 360,000 letters, involving an estimated 4 million Party members, enforcement remains an internal Party affair, with retaliation against whistle-blowers not uncommon.58 Conclusion This paper, using a variety of public opinion data, has argued that the CCP has become estranged from a rapidly changing Chinese society. top officials (such as the special supply of food, the use of foreign cars, and the use of public funds for gift giving and entertaining guests), and much tougher measures against those involved in corruption, bribe-taking and profiteering. The stress in this new campaign is on adherence to 'the principle of "all are equal before the law"'.59 The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) has called for stricter supervision of Party officials working in business.
There are several reasons, however, to question the likely effectiveness of this new campaign. First, there have been similar campaigns launched with great publicity in the past, but they generally wind down after a few months. Second, the campaign has been tied to the criticism of Zhao Ziyang, who is blamed for the inaction against official profiteering and corruption, and even accused of 'vindicating a small number of children of senior cadres who were engaged in speculative profiteering activities'.60 Since Zhao's two sons were engaged in questionable business activities and his daughter was an assistant manager of a joint venture hotel, it seems likely that, following precedent, the major corruption cases to be uncovered will be politically determined, and will involve the families of those who have fallen from power. Allusions to capitalism and additional references to class struggle further suggest that conservatives in the leadership are already attempting to divert the anti-corruption campaign into a move to derail at least part of the reform program. It is therefore not surprising that the most senior official to be punished for corruption thus far is Liang Xiang, the former governor of Hainan Island, and a close ally of Zhao.
In the past, Deng has had to intervene to prevent such retrogressive attempts to interfere with his economic agenda, calling off previous campaigns so as to deter conservative ambitions.
What makes the effectiveness of the campaign particularly unlikely is the continued reluctance to open Party affairs to outside scrutiny. Although Chinese leaders plan to disclose their property and income, it appears that such disclosures will be made only to elite state or Party organs, and will remain confidential. As before, the public will be allowed to report corruption cases, but will be unable to bring corrupt officials to justice. The Party will continue to monitor itself. Even ostensible appeals to the public to help monitor Party activities can present mixed signals. For example, wide circulation has been given to a speech Deng delivered on 8 April 1957 entitled 'The Communist Party Must Accept Supervision'. However, parts of the speech explicitly reject the public's qualifications for supervision: 'Whether the Communist Party is qualified for leadership or not depends on our Party itself. It does not matter whether the people recognize it or not. If you are qualified, even if the people do not think so, you are still qualified. If you are not qualified, even if the people think you are qualified, you are still unqualified'. Moreover, few Chinese would be unaware that less than two months after this speech was given, the Party launched a campaign against its critics, victimizing hundreds of thousands.61
Another likely result of the 1989 unrest is a shift in the criteria for Party membership. The CCDI has announced that the Party will expel all members who played leading roles in the 'counter-revolutionary chaos'. Political loyalty and discipline have re-emerged as the primary standards for Party members, with one Beijing ministry dividing members into four groups: resolute supporters, wavering members, those who wish to resign from the Party, and those who oppose the Party outright. 62 In termns of class composition, the CCP should find it difficult to recruit students and intellectuals in the immediate future. Indeed, that may not be a high priority. There has been a reaffirmation of the working class as the 'main force' in the country, which 'some people' had 'disputed'. Although intellectuals are part of this class, it has nevertheless been acknowledged that industrial workers in large and medium-sized enterprises 'who have created most of the country's social wealth... have felt slighted and this has caused frustration and resentment'. Not long ago it was the intellectuals who were being implemented nationwide. Although long, authoritative articles on Party building have appeared in virtually every provincial Party newspaper, the Beijing Committee thus far is the only one to have openly announced their support for this decision in a resolution and to have carried it out vigorously. The mid-October 1989 resolution also told Party members that they should 'spend their post-tax profits on production and public welfare and should not use them for their own private needs'. Accompanying this appeal for austerity was a call for ideological consolidation. This was to be accomplished by a national drive to expel members who had supported the democracy movement too vigorously.64 Hong Kong accounts, quoting Chinese sources, noted that the goal of the Party committee was to expel 50,000 'unorthodox' Party members out of Beijing's total of 910,000 members. Hardliners hoped to use this as a prelude to a re-registration of Party members in the capital, a task expected to be completed by the end of 1990.
Another target group for recruitment may be young soldiers, most of whom are poorly educated peasant youth. Those who were killed clearing the square have been posthumously admitted into the CCP.65
Moreover, the Chinese press has criticized the emphasis on 'privatization' of the economy under Zhao, with Jiang Zemin, the new general secretary of the CCP, suggesting that individuals engaged in private enterprise may be making too much money.66 This will reduce the Party's flirtation with the rural rich and promote the chances of poor but ideologically orthodox peasants.
By contrast, intellectuals before and after the demonstrations were withdrawing or threatening to withdraw from the Party. On 1 July 1989, on the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Party, 318 students and scholars studying in the United States announced their joint withdrawal in an open letter. Before the demonstrations, there had been persistent rumours that a large number of intellectuals at Beijing University were planning to resign from the Party en masse on the 70th anniversary of the May 4th Movement as a protest against restrictions on freedom. When one prominent intellectual -Party theorist Zhang Xianyang -who had been expelled by the CCP as a 'bourgeois liberal' in 1987 addressed a forum of graduate students at Beijing University in 1988, he informed the students that he regretted he had not been expelled ten years earlier, since Party discipline had deprived him of the freedom to speak the truth. While the CCP continues to insist that intellectuals remain crucial to the success of the modernization program, they have also warned 'conscientious intellectuals' to 'reconsider' their role in the unrest.
For Chinese university students, there has been a return to heavy-handed political indoctrination and a series of measures apparently implemented more as a punishment and control mechanism than out of any strong conviction regarding their efficacy. Incoming freshmen are to undergo military training before beginning their coursework; most university graduates will be required to work for a year or two in villages or factories before being permitted to enter graduate school; overall, incoming enrolment is to be cut by 30,000 (out of 640,000), with most of the cuts in the social sciences; and so forth. Prestigious Beijing University, the political centre of the student unrest, was hit most severely. New enrolment was cut from a projected 2,000 down to 811; the disciplines of history, philosophy, international relations, and public administration have been closed to new students; and military training for freshmen would last one year and be conducted in a military camp outside Beijing. 71 The essence of patriotism has been defined as 'ardent love for socialist New China under the CCP leadership'. 72 The CYL has called on all its members 'to learn from the Liberation Army, to take heroes as their model'.73 Explicitly, there have been calls to bring back the 68 Daily Report, 5 April 1989, pp.32-33 (Cheng Ming, 1 Apri).
successful political education of the 1950s and 1960s, when Marxist theories and theoretical workers were respected. 74 Since surveys have consistently shown that students are least interested in political study, it is difficult to see how stepped-up ideological indoctrination, at a time when the regime is most unpopular, can be successful in reducing student alienation. The regime's own polling has discovered a 'distinctive generation gap as far as political attitudes and political tendencies are concerned'. With the Party lacking a unified ideology and therefore no longer recruiting on an ideological basis, age had become a better predictor of attitudes than Party membership. As one survey concluded, 'the generation gap is wider than the Party gap'.75
Even assuming some attempt at reorientation, the CCP faces the same contradictions that it did prior to the unrest. Party journals make clear the dilemma the CCP faces in its recruitment and education policy, trying to reconcile the ideal standards of selfless service that the Party constitution mandates with the expectations of material benefits Party members currently entertain. China's leading ideological journal has noted that 'a considerable number' of members have difficulty with the current constitution. Some feel the exhortation to serve the people wholeheartedly is out of date and hard to put into practice. They also question whether Party members must devote themselves to struggling for the realization of communism, since it is not certain that there will ever be a communist society.76 The Central Committee and State Council directives prohibiting Party and government cadres from engaging in business or managing enterprises has also elicited dissatisfaction from cadres. CCP authorities admit that the average income of cadres is less than the income of those engaged in commercial or business enterprises, and that the situation is 'abnormal', but urge the cadres to wait for a deepening of the reforms, an increase in state Each reimposition of political restrictiveness will threaten economic gains.80
The CCP will have to achieve a modus vivendi with the society it governs. The first step will necessitate a redefinition of the role of the Party and the standards for Party members. It is no longer realistic to expect CCP members to adhere to an ideology which offers primarily spiritual rewards and which few still believe in, while the rest of society is promised material benefits. To attract the young and well-educated necessary for the reform program to succeed, the Party must offer tangible rewards, including opportunities to exercise real decisionmaking power and rapid social mobility for the talented. The institutionalization of such a system, however, will only be possible after the octogenarian guardians of the half-Maoist half-Dengist partially reformed hybrid have finally been laid to rest.
Los Angeles March 1990
80 It should be noted, however, that 'new authoritarianism' was actually put forward by social scientists associated with Zhao Ziyang and is thus being critiqued in China today. The current policy is better described as 'old authoritarianism'.
